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The City's View 
Sitting back, feet propped up on a cluttered wooden 
desk, clad casually in well worn loafers, dark corduroy 
slacks, and a plaid shirt open at the neck, Steve Clifford 
reflects on his last two years at the helm of perhaps the 
biggest municipal accounting project ever undertaken. 
And he makes it seem so easy. 
"We simply had the mandate," he says. "There was no 
alternative. It had to work, that's all." 
As a special deputy in the New York City comptroller's 
office, Clifford's task these past two years has been to act 
as a director of that city's integrated financial management 
system (IFMS). Devising the system, which went on line 
July 1 at the beginning of the 1977-78 fiscal year, was under 
the direction of Clifford and co-director David Wood-
bridge of the mayor's office, the pair working closely with 
five independent consulting firms. 
Frank Zolfo, New York partner and the Touche Ross 
project director from 7-1-76 to 7-31-77, characterizes the 
development of IFMS as "motivated by the city's need to 
improve its procedures for obtaining timely, reliable fi-
nancial information and for controlling its revenues and 
expenditures." 
Essentially, the objectives of the new system were four-
fold: (1) to facilitate improved financial management of 
the city's resources by each agency; (2) to exercise sound 
budgetary and accounting control over city revenues and 
expenses; (3) to report financial information accurately to 
city managers, federal and state officials, the investment 
community, and the general public; and (4) to develop an 
auditabie system, one which will ultimately enable an 
independent auditor to render a clean opinion. 
And it was anything but easy. Putting such a system to-
gether involved close cooperation between the mayor's of-
fice and the comptroller's office, the diligence of close to 
1,000 municipal personnel involved in the project, more 
than 500,000 man-hours of support work among the five 
consultants, and a cost to the city of more than $76 million. 
"At the outset," says Clifford, "the city's financial sys-
tems were a shambles. That was recognized by any num-
ber of people at the state and federal levels. As the city's 
fiscal crisis heated up in 1975, these people began asking 
for certain types of information, and the city just couldn't 
produce that information. It became painfully evident that 
the city really didn't have a hold on its own budgetary 
systems, accounting systems, or control systems. It was 
pure chaos." 
The first step to alleviate that chaos came with the 
issuance of a white paper from the comptroller's office in 
June, 1975, calling for a new accounting system. But what 
really got IFMS under way was the state's passage of legis-
lation that same year establishing the Municipal Assistance 
Corporation (MAC). This legislation required the city to 
reform its accounting and budgeting systems to conform 
to standards acceptable to the state comptroller. 
"However, the MAC law spoke only to accounting," 
Clifford recalls, "whereas the big problem in the city was 
the lack of control and the lack of information. Account-
ing is an after-the-fact kind of thing, and, after the fact, if 
we had enough accountants we could probably put to-
gether proper statements on an annual basis without 
changing the system. But nobody knew this at the time, 
certainly not the appropriating bodies." 
Woodbridge and Clifford, therefore, ordered a system 
to be designed that would simultaneously meet the city's 
needs for financial control, planning analysis, and ac-
countability—with an emphasis on control. The scope of 
the project would encompass most citywide financial 
management functions, such as budgeting, payroll, pur-
chasing (encumbrance control), accounting (including ac-
counts receivable, accounts payable, and warrant recon-
ciliation), and financial reporting of all kinds. The plan 
called for IFMS to operate as a unified system. Citywide 
budgeting, accounting, purchasing, and payroll functions 
would be brought together in a single computer facility at 
the new financial information services agency (FISA). 
Each major subsystem (such as payroll) would be able to 
access data from a single data base that would also hold 
information from the other subsystems (such as budget-
ing). Thus the need for payroll to maintain its own separate 
version of the budget would be eliminated. Moreover, 
account coding in the budgeting and accounting subsys-
tems would be identical, greatly simplifying agency coding 
on vouchers and comparisons of budgeted to actual 
performance. 
There seemed little question in anyone's mind that the 
project could succeed. What bothered most people was 
the time frame imposed by that M A C legislation, which 
called for an auditable system as of July 1,1977. That gave 
co-directors Woodbridge and Clifford scarcely more than 
a year and a half to put their program in working order. 
Woodbridge, however, feels the compressed time frame 
may have been a blessing in disguise. 
"What happens in the public sector as well as in the 
private sector," says the conservatively dressed, baldish, 
40-year-old systems expert on loan from Chase Manhat-
tan, "is that the amount of work needed for completion 
of a given project will always expand to fill the amount of 
time allotted for it. In this case, there was a tight deadline 
and everyone knew it. We either got the job done or we 
didn't. So we broke all the rules of the book and got away 
with it because there was no other way. We'd give city 
management a chance to be involved in every decision, 
for example, but if the people didn't respond quickly 
enough we went ahead and implemented the decision on 
our own." 
Woodbridge's sentiments are echoed by Kenneth S. 
Axelson, then deputy mayor for finance and the man who 
handpicked Woodbridge for the job. Says Axelson: "All 
the objectives and obstacles, all the political differences 
one might expect at every stage of such a vast municipal 
undertaking were effectively swept aside through legisla-
tive mandate. For example, we were asking the city 
council to appropriate $16 million. Normally, this would 
have resulted in prolonged debate. In this case, there was 
not time for debate. There was no alternative to the 
program we were proposing." 
That sense of direction is one major reason why, accord-
ing to Axelson, the project was able to succeed where 
others might have failed. "Failure to succeed," he said, 
"would have been a mark against all of those involved. It 
was an important measure of the managerial skills of the 
city and of the will and determination of the political 
community, as well as the supportive business community, 
to cope with the city's fiscal problem." 
Steve Clifford puts it more succinctly: "It is important to 
remember that this was an election year, if my boss Jay 
Goldin, the comptroller, had wanted to make an issue 
out of this mess, he certainly could have. It wouldn't have 
been a very big issue, but it would have involved the same 
old charges of continued mismanagement, a waste of $16 
million, et cetera, et cetera. In this connection, it is 
important to realize the degree of interest the press had 
already shown in the project. It is very unusual for a system 
to have that sort of visibility, that sort of pressure. What 
that meant was that we really got whatever we wanted." 
What exactly was it that the architects of IFMS wanted? 
"From the outset," Clifford answers, "we wanted to 
devise a system that was able to control the city budget. 
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This was the most critical function. There was no way 
under the existing system to assure that the budget would 
remain in balance., but we wanted to make it possible 
without handcuffing the managers of city agencies. You 
can always impose such rigid budget controls that mana-
gers can't get their jobs done; but we sought to increase 
their discretion, their flexibility of operation. Obviously a 
fundamental goai was to establish proper accounting 
procedures for the city agencies. This, however, was not 
enough. We also wanted to improve the information 
available, to help them make managerial decisions that 
depended on accounting procedures and control sys-
tems." 
Given the ambitious nature of these goals, then, and the 
collapsing time frame in which the IFMS co-directors had 
to work, it became clear that working procedures must be 
radically different. 
"To give us a running start," says Woodbridge, "outside 
consultants were brought in. They had the expertise we 
needed to solve organizational problems as they arose—or 
before they arose." Altogether, five outside firms played 
separate but interrelated roles in shaping the organization 
of IFMS. American Management Systems had already 
done work with the city in other areas of computer 
systems development. Bradford National had both the 
hardware and the experience to set up the potentially 
unwieldly city payroll system, 
"Two accounting firms worked closely with us," says 
Woodbridge. "Touche Ross and Ernst & Ernst. The former 
proved especially useful in anticipating and coping with 
operational problems arising in the office of management 
and budget (OMB) and the comptroller's office. Also, the 
Urban Academy did a whale of a job in undertaking 
training in all levels at the outset of the program. 
"There was no sense of competition among the consult-
ing firms," adds Woodbridge. "There wasn't time for that. 
Each group recognized what its own contributions should 
be and what it might expect of the others." 
Representatives of the consulting firms, for their part, 
cite yet another reason for the program's success—name-
ly, Woodbridge and Clifford themselves. "I think Steve 
and Dave just did a superb job in managing the project, 
making hard decisions in overseeing ail the work all the 
time," says Harvey Susswein, project director for American 
Management Systems. "They also ran interference for all 
us outside consultants, which, in turn, permitted us to do a 
more effective job. What they did, essentially, was estab-
lish a new city agency on three months' notice." 
"They were an excellent team," agrees Frank Zolfo. 
"Clifford took the role of looking at things from an 
overall macro level, and Woodbridge looked at things at a 
micro and detailed level. They coordinated with one 
another very well. They kept each other informed, and I 
don't think the project could have been done by either of 
them alone." 
Axelson notes a singularly interesting aspect of this 
relationship. "Dave Woodbridge and Steve Clifford are 
two very different types of personalities," he points out, 
"with different backgrounds and different working styles. 
Yet they worked so well together that their leadership 
gave the whole project the sense of unity it needed for 
success." 
Still, there were serious doubts that the project would 
be successful. 
"1 suppose the reasons for such skepticism," says Axel-
son, "were twofold. First of all, nothing of this magnitude 
had ever been accomplished—especially not in this time ( ; 
"From the outset, we wanted 
to devise a system that was able 
to control the city budget.77 
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frame. Then, too, it was common knowledge that New 
York City's bureaucracy supposedly was hopelessly inef-
ficient and incompetent. Hence, if private industry had 
never been able to bring off something of this sort, it was 
inconceivable that it could be done in the public sector." 
Two operational factors seem to have been responsible 
for the remarkable success of IFMS. The first is implicit in 
Woodbridge's attitude toward "breaking all the rules of 
the book." TR's Gerald R. Riso, New York partner and 
project director from 8-1-77 to the present, describes 
Woodbridge himself "as a man with skill at organizing data 
systems techniques. To the extent that Woodbridge felt it 
necessary to break out of this mold, he demonstrated not 
only the technical proficiency, but the sense of urgency 
for getting the job done." Of Clifford, Riso notes some 
modification of style as well: "He never lost sight of the 
overriding objectives—namely, to make things work. He 
was capable of making on-the-spot decisions, yet backing 
down from those decisions anytime it could be demon-
strated to him that the negative consequences outweighed 
the positive. In short, he was a businessman in an environ-
ment that wasn't used to it." 
While decisions were being made all along the way, 
there remained the need to train a vast crew of 7,500 city 
personnel at all working levels. The decision was made 
early to formulate an entirely new system of operation. 
"Looking back," says Sandi Manilla, chief of the division 
of financial planning in the comptroller's office, "it would 
have been otherwise impossible to motivate three or four 
thousand people to do new jobs in new ways." This meant 
the clerical staffs at each city agency had to be trained, not 
only to perform new functions but to think in new 
directions. 
How successful was this motivational effort? 
"There were some older people," says Manilla, "who 
took their retirements rather than adapt. But, by and large, 
the staffs adjusted well. Not without the usual grumblings, 
naturally. Nobody particularly likes change; but, when 
you can show them how much easier their jobs will be as a 
result of the change, they are a lot more willing to make 
the effort." 
With proper training and motivation, the newly con-
structed system emerged unscathed, and the curtain went 
up on July 1. "Despite all predictions of doom, there were 
no May-day strikes, no fouled-up purchase orders," says 
Susswein. "In fact, we managed under IFMS to achieve, 
initially, an 80 percent acceptance rate on documents 
processed through the system, compared with an expec-
ted 50 percent error rate. And, by the second pass, we 
generally had that rate over the 95 percent mark." 
Now in place, the "integrated" system means that city 
planners will have good numbers on which to base their 
estimates and control functions. "Certainly," says Riso, "if 
city officials want to, they can still play with numbers; they 
can still create problems by being unrealistic about reve-
nue estimates, the probability of securing grants and such. 
However, the presumption from the start was that people 
wanted to do their job on the basis of accurate informa-
tion, and these people are now going to be able to do a 
better job. So the will to use controls is up to the agency 
managers and, indeed, to the top levels of city govern-
ment." 
It was a hectic two years for city personnel. So much so 
that the implementation has been almost anticlimactic. 
"During the week before July 1," says Pat Hardiman, 
assistant to the city's chief accountant, "we were all pretty 
much geared up for misses and near-misses and a lot of 
overtime, trying to iron out whatever bugs developed 
once the system was in place. Then came the big d a y . . . 
wel l . , .no big bugs, no overtime. In fact, we simply went 
home at five o'clock, which was something we hadn't 
done in weeks. 
"So what else is there to say? It worked,"—K.P. 
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Little has been written about the reorganization of New 
York City's financial management systems from the 
consultant's point of view. This has in part been deliberate. 
One of the major objectives of the reorganization has 
been to establish the city's own credibility—for its people, 
its structure, its systems. 
"The city's success was to be our success," says John 
McCreight, the first of three partners to be responsible for 
the Touche Ross role in the reorganization. "And our first 
objective in late 1975 was to enable the city to tell the 
financial community to be patient until 1977, that fiscal 
changes were on the way." 
What occurred behind the consultants' doors during 
this $16 million effort by New York City? Clearly, a major 
challenge to the professionals of all five consulting firms 
was the deadline—July 1,1977—for putting the city's 
records into auditable shape. This left but 18 months to 
accomplish what The New York Times has termed "per-
haps one of the most important reforms in city govern-
ment in this century." 
Frank Zolfo, second Touche Ross partner to head his 
firm's efforts in this crucial period, compares the experi-
ence with running a 26-mile marathon. "Most of us were 
physically tired at the end and mentally tired, and 1 think 
the city people were as well." Adds Touche Ross mana-
ger Neil Thall, "We're talking about something like 150,000 
man-hours for Touche Ross alone—probably the largest 
systems operation ever conducted in so short a time." 
The time pressure was compounded by the complex 
environment the consultants had to work in. Manager 
Richard Stanton, quiet and friendly behind a built-in 
frown, describes "working with a client who often did not 
know how its own systems worked. That is, a few city 
people knew the general flow of the manual systems, but 
they were not familiar with the details—while clerks would 
simply process a form without knowing where it came 
from or where it went next. And the information available 
was often wrong. It was extremely difficult to build the 
master files on which to base our work." 
Moreover, four of the five consultants were not only 
seeking the same information, they were also reviewing 
each other's work. Partner Gerald Riso currently leads the 
Touche Ross implementation work for the city with a low 
key approach that contrasts to the intensity supplied by 
Zolfo during the critical months. "At first, I wondered if 
there were not more problems than it was worth—asking 
consultants from five firms to work together in an equal 
partnership. Would they admit a problem to a competitor, 
such as a failure to meet a deadline? But equality worked. 
And city officials told me that it gave them a sense of 
participation, a knowledge of what was going on that was 
important to them. Happily, they were dealing with peo-
ple who adhered to high professional standards, people 
driven to get the job done." 
Coordinating upwards of 200 consultants from five firms 
and three major city offices was another concern. Accord-
ing to Frank Zolfo, his consultants attended 30 to 40 
meetings daily just to keep their activities integrated to a 
constantly changing situation. O n a more formal basis, 
representatives from each consulting firm and the city met 
once a week to review developments. In addition, Touche 
Ross assigned one staff person to interface with an equal at 
each consulting firm. Indeed, the firms were always alert 
to upcoming changes in the strategy and plans of the other 
organizations. When it came to Touche Ross' own 35 to 40 
consultants keeping in touch with each other, says Zolfo, 
"we lived with tape recorders in our pockets. Being tied 
up at evening sessions, we were constantly taping the day's 
activities to let the left hand know what the right hand was 
doing," 
Overall this activity hung the possibility that the state 
legislature's July 1,1977 deadline would not be met—that 
the new system would break down in a cloud of smoke 
and the dismantled old system would not be available to 
replace it. The consequence of firemen, policemen, and 
others not getting paid, for example, was a development 
the city dreaded to face. Thus, Touche Ross put together a 
team that worked for four months on a contingency 
plan—a fact that was little known because the plan was 
never used. 
Meanwhile, New York City employees—long used to 
seeing consultants ask questions, project new ideas, and 
then disappear without causing a ripple of change dis-
covered that this time the consultants were not going 
away. Unlike in private industry, where management 
decides whether or not to exceed the budget, in the 
public sector the budget is law. The consultants were 
engaged to assure that the law was followed. 
The city's fiscal problems in the mid-70s had been 
compounded by budget improprieties. For example, voca-
tional education expenses might be included in the capita! 
budget, rather than the expense budget where they be-
longed. The theory was that benefits would be enjoyed by 
students for years to come. "Under a capital budget, if $40 
million were raised by 20-year bonds," explains senior 
consultant Ira Feinberg, "only $2 or $3 million would need 
to be paid that year rather than the entire $40 million." 
Tall, with curly hair, Feinberg has the relaxed, casual 
manner typical of the new breed of consultants. "Also, 
controls were minimal. Expenses would be broken down 
by their purpose—such as snow removal, which might cut 
across several agencies—instead of being under one de-
partment responsible for the activity." 
To make the city's records auditable, the entire new 
system had to work within the framework of generally 
accepted accounting principles. Neil Thai I, a slight, neatly 
tailored Touche Ross manager, worked in the comptrol-
ler's office, "Our job was to determine how applying 
accounting principles would impact our control of the 
city's finances. Which revenues could be accrued and 
which could be accounted for on a cash basis? How would 
the accounting be handled for such items as bonds and 
sales tax revenues in the financial statements of the 
Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) Fund? How 
would we account for the fact that pension fund admini-
strators were two years behind in calculating pension 
liabilities? The questions went on and on." 
The biggest challenge, Thall states, was to establish 
consistent principles that were understandable, "Formerly 
the financial statements ran up to 500 pages and were 
completely incomprehensible. You had to be an insider to 
understand what a line of information meant. The comp-
troller's office eliminated three-quarters of that material 
and set up an understandable and consistent statement to 
which we then applied the figures for fiscal 76 and fiscal 
77. This was to give the official 78 audit under the new 
system a base to compare its figures to," 
The consultants' world of accounting, budgeting, and 
systems was held together in New York City by an idea 
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called IFMS. Pronounced "iffmiss," it is the acronym for 
integrated financial management system—in simple terms 
a computerized system in which a change in the amounts 
for one agency or department hooked into the system will 
impact all other departments affected by that change. 
Ira Feinberg explains the key encumbrance concept that 
grew out of the IFMS. "That was an innovation. When a 
purchase order is placed, the money is reserved, or 
encumbered, in the budget center—there are 1,000 such 
centers—responsible for the purchase. Thus, a purchase 
order can be stopped from going out whenever it causes 
that budget category to be exceeded." 
Altogether, the IFMS project has required the develop-
ment of 20 general procedure manuals, 60 operation 
manuals for the user agencies, and 10 manuals for the 
operation of the computerized information system. To 
some of the consultants, the time spent preparing such 
manuals did not offer a major intellectual challenge. Frank 
Zolfo agrees that "it was not the type of analytical work 
they enjoy, perhaps, but there was certainly an intellectual 
challenge in writing a set of manuals that city people could 
understand, that provided the controls needed, and that 
would provide a system that worked." Clearly, keeping 
the professional staff stimulated and not bogged down in 
detail was a constant challenge to project managers. 
There were 7,500 people on the city's staff who had to 
be trained in the new system. What was the caliber, the 
commitment of these city personnel? There is no clear 
answer. Feinberg describes a group of budget examiners, 
"young college grad types," who were highly cooperative, 
while other members of the city's staff did not care to 
learn a new way of doing things. Thall cites a dozen people 
in the comptroller's office "who were motivated, who 
really wanted to help, who spent a Sot of overtime hours 
on the project—and they are the ones who are going to be 
running the comptroller's office from now on. Sandi 
Manilla, for example, got right in there and called a spade 
a spade; she wasn't afraid of going after people who 
weren't doing things correctly. Pat Hardiman was another 
excellent person." 
The challenge, says Feinberg, was to establish credibility 
with city people. "For example, you could not get in front 
of 30 budget examiners and give a typical consulting 
presentation with transparencies. You had to learn to sit 
back and let people blow off steam, which wasn't directed 
at you but at their own frustrations. You had to understand 
where they were coming from. And you never said, here is 
the solution that will save the city; you described six ways 
to do a job and then got them to agree that one was the 
easiest or most effective. It was important to preplan the 
meeting, to know who was coming, what their points of 
view would be, and who were the one or two people 
whose opinion really mattered." 
"At first," notes Gerald Riso, "some consultants were 
prejudiced against municipal employees. Some of us 
doubted they were sufficiently motivated or smart enough 
to make the new system work. But the answer to this is that 
today the new system is working. The data is accurate, 
reports are coming out when they are supposed to, and 
the right information is getting to the right people." 
Thus, the city did not go up in smoke and recrimination 
on July 1,1977. Riso sums up the basic achievements: 
"First, a single system, not a separate set of books, now 
exists for the mayor and the comptroller. Second, the city's 
accounting policies are in accord with generally accepted 
accounting principles. And, third, sound financial plan-
ning is possible—because there are budget and purchas-
ing controls, and because you cannot take credit any more 
for revenue that does not exist." 
"What is not sure," adds Frank Zolfo, "is whether the 
people who run the city are going to use the system 
properly. Are Koch and his team going to have the 
courage and wisdom to make the right choices?" If they 
do not, he suggests, "people who are outside looking in 
are going to have a much clearer sense of what is happen-
ing in their city—and that may not be a bad thing, either." 
Assuming the system is used, how much will it impact 
the city's financial crisis? Gerald Riso believes the prob-
lems of New York City go beyond the scope of its IFMS 
project. "The city must also ask itself if it should be in the 
health care and education businesses. Should it provide 
services or contract for them? Is it taxing the right people? 
Are its labor negotiations sound? What IFMS can do is help 
the city to respond to those issues, and, if so, it will have 
paid off even more." 
When John McCreight assumed responsibility for 
Touche Ross' initial involvement in the city's fiscal crisis, 
he was asked: will the patient die? His answer: the patient 
is not the physical presence of New York City, nor is it the 
city administration. "It is the people who live and work in 
the city. And the patient is alive and well. The administra-
tion may go through hell, and perhaps people in the 
administration will die. But the patient itself will not die." 
"I'm not a native New Yorker," says Neil Thall, "but it's 
my home now, and I feel an affinity for this city. I often 
look at the consulting jobs I do and the clients I work with, 
and I ask myself if what I am doing is having a positive 
impact on society. Well, on this New York City project, I 
really believe I helped the city. I honestly feel I impacted it 
and caused positive change. I was helping my community 
and it felt good. I met a lot of people who will be important 
some day in this city, and they feel the same way."—R.P. 
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